Playback ’95] Water Shortage, Sanitation Problems… The Epic “Survival” Faced by Survivors of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake

What did “FRIDAY” report 10, 20, or 30 years ago? We look back at the topics that were hot at the time [Playback Friday]. This time, we will introduce a part from the February 7, 1995 extra edition of “Urgent extra edition: The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in Kansai(*),” which reported the situation at the time of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, which will mark 30 years on January 17. (*The name “Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake” was decided by the Cabinet on February 14, 1995.)

At 5:46 a.m. on January 17, 1995. At 5:46 a.m. on January 17, 1995, the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, an earthquake of magnitude 7.3, struck Kobe City, Hyogo Prefecture, and a wide area of the Kinki region. At its peak, more than 310,000 residents lost their homes and had to evacuate. This was the first time since the end of World War II that so many people were affected by a disaster of this magnitude.

There was no water! …People flocked to water trucks ahead of others

There is just too little information available,” said one resident. We have no idea where to go for water rations or where to inquire about missing persons.
A young man who evacuated to Wakana Elementary School in Kobe’s Chuo Ward could not hide his anger at the government’s slow response to the disaster.

Water was a critical issue at the evacuation center, where the disaster victims fled for their lives in their clothes. In the case of Wakana Elementary School, the Self-Defense Forces’ water trucks arrived only twice by the morning of the third day after the earthquake. At times, there were skirmishes between the Self-Defense Forces personnel and the people who were flocking to the water trucks.

Also, at the Nagata Ward Office, only one bottle of oolong tea per person was distributed as food rations. Even when drinking water was finally distributed, it was common for people to wait two to three hours in line before they could drink it. On the other hand, there were places like Port Island where drinking water was abundantly available. The road conditions may have been a factor, but there seemed to be a difference in the amount of assistance provided depending on the area.

Flush toilets don’t work at all.”

When water is not supplied to the people, they have no choice but to search for water by themselves.

People lined up in long queues at wells and crowded around burst water pipes. People wash their dishes, shave their beards, and of course, many use the water for drinking.

I don’t know if this water is tap water or sewage water, but I can’t turn my back on it. I believe it is tap water, so I boil it before drinking it.

At Eiwa Bridge on the Tsuga River in Nada Ward, some people were washing their clothes in the river.

I’m sleeping in my car with my children because my house burned down. If there is no running water, we have to do whatever we can,” said a housewife with a child.

The toilet situation was also a serious concern for the disaster victims.

The flushing toilets are not functioning at all. At Koumei Elementary School in Takarazuka City, women would line up at night with buckets of pool water to use the toilets. After using the toilet, they flush it with water. However, this was only a blessing in disguise because they could use the pool water. There were almost no temporary toilets, and many facilities were still struggling to dispose of the excrement.

As of January 20, 1995, water was almost completely cut off in Kobe, Nishinomiya, and Ashiya, as well as in many other areas of Hyogo Prefecture. However, there was no indication of restoration at all due to the large number of water pipes that had burst in various parts of the city, and the possibility that water pipes from water purification plants and distribution centers had been destroyed. Other lifelines such as electricity, gas, and telephone services were also expected to take one to two months to be restored.

Food was apparently easier to obtain than water. Some grocery stores volunteered to open stores to dispose of their stock even though they could not stock it, and some major supermarkets chartered ferries to bring in emergency supplies to open for business.

It seems that many people “escaped” from the disaster area in anticipation of the prolongation of the severe situation.

On the morning of January 10, the National Route 2, the main road connecting Osaka and Kobe, was flooded with cars full of people who had evacuated, saying, “I can no longer live in this city for the time being. All the hotels in Osaka were already full with these victims.

Many people were frustrated with the response of the city and local governments, but what was noticeable as they witnessed the situation was the slowness of the national government’s response. The earthquake occurred at 5:46 a.m., but the government did not realize the seriousness of the situation until the afternoon. An emergency press conference was finally held at 4:00 pm.

Lessons Learned from the Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake” in Exchange for the Devastating Loss of Life

The government’s slow initial response, especially the delay in dispatching the Self-Defense Forces, was criticized, and the then cabinet of Tomiichi Murayama suffered a sharp drop in popularity after the disaster. The Governor of Hyogo Prefecture issued a full-fledged disaster relief mission at 10:00 am. Caught in a traffic jam near the site, rescue operations by the Self-Defense Forces in Kobe did not begin until after 1:00 pm.

Another problem that arose during the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake was the poor environment of the evacuation centers. Many people were under great stress in the overcrowded evacuation centers, and many became ill due to poor sanitary conditions, such as in the toilets. The term “earthquake-related deaths” was coined because not a few people died. 900 people are estimated to have died, but the actual number is thought to be much higher because the definition of “related deaths” was still vague.

Volunteers helped the government in its confusion. It is said that more than 1.37 million people volunteered to distribute food and supplies and to help in soup kitchens and other activities during the first year after the earthquake. Since volunteer organizations were later legally recognized as non-profit organizations (NPOs), 1995 is also known as the “first year of volunteerism.

In exchange for the tremendous loss of life, the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake left behind many lessons. These lessons have been steadily applied in subsequent disasters such as the Great East Japan Earthquake, including the establishment of wide-area disaster relief teams and disaster dispatch medical teams (DMAT). At the same time, however, it has been pointed out that in last year’s Noto earthquake, the initial response was delayed and the deployment of the Self-Defense Forces and emergency firefighting teams was rushed in at a snail’s pace due to an inaccurate assessment of the disaster situation, which did not keep pace with the needs on the ground. There were also reports that the number of volunteers was inadequate because the prefectural governor had called on volunteers not to come.

When another major disaster occurs in a major city, will we be able to apply the lessons of 30 years ago?