Surviving the Aftermath: Water Shortages and Sanitation Crisis Following the Great Hanshin Earthquake

What was FRIDAY reporting 10, 20, or 30 years ago? In [Playback Friday], we revisit the topics that were making headlines at the time. This time, we look back at the events surrounding the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, which reached its 30th anniversary on January 17. We’ll highlight some of the coverage from the February 7, 1995 special edition, “Emergency Special Edition: Kansai Earthquake” (Note: The name “Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake” was officially decided by the Cabinet on February 14, 1995).

On January 17, 1995, at 5:46 a.m., a magnitude 7.3 inland earthquake struck a wide area of the Kinki region, centered around Kobe City, Hyogo Prefecture. Over 310,000 people were displaced as a result of the disaster, making this the first post-war event of its kind.

There was no water! People flocked to water trucks ahead of others

“There’s just too little information. I have no idea where to go for water distribution or where to inquire about missing persons. It’s impossible to find out anything,” said a young man seeking refuge at Wakana Elementary School in central Kobe. He was clearly frustrated with the slow response of local authorities to the needs of the disaster victims.

For those who had fled to shelters, the most urgent issue was water. At Wakana Elementary School, for example, it wasn’t until the third morning after the earthquake that the Self-Defense Forces’ water trucks arrived, and they came only twice. At times, scuffles broke out between the people rushing toward the trucks and the Self-Defense Force personnel.

At Nagata Ward Office, the only water distributed as part of the food supply was oolong tea, and each person was given just one bottle. Even when drinking water started to be distributed, it was common to wait 2 to 3 hours in line before finally receiving it. On the other hand, there were areas like Port Island, where drinking water was distributed in abundance. The uneven distribution of aid appeared to be influenced, at least in part, by road conditions, resulting in significant disparities in the assistance provided across different regions.

“The flush toilets aren’t working at all.”

When water distribution was insufficient, people had no choice but to search for water on their own.

“Where there were wells, people formed long lines, and around the burst water pipes, people gathered as well. Some washed pots with the flowing water, others shaved, and many used it for drinking.

‘We don’t know if this water is potable or wastewater, but we have no choice. I’m boiling it just in case I trust it’s clean,’ said a person collecting water at a burst water pipe in Minamimachi, Higashinada Ward.”

At the Eiwa Bridge over the Tsugagawa River in Nada Ward, people were also washing clothes in the river.

“Our house burned down, so we’re sleeping in the car with the kids. If there’s no water, we just have to make do with whatever we can,” said a housewife with children.

The issue of toilets was another serious problem for the victims.

“The flush toilets aren’t working at all. At Kōmei Elementary School in Takarazuka, women were lining up at night, carrying buckets of pool water to use in the toilets. Afterward, they would flush with the pool water. But, this was better than nothing; many places had no temporary toilets, and most facilities were struggling with waste disposal.”

As of January 20, 1995, the entire area of Hyogo Prefecture, including Kobe, Nishinomiya, and Ashiya, had almost no water supply, and many other areas were still without water. The water supply system was severely damaged by broken water pipes, and it was unclear when it would be restored, especially with the possibility that water treatment plants and distribution facilities had also been destroyed. Other lifelines, such as electricity, gas, and telephone services, were also expected to take one to two months to restore.

As for food, it was generally easier to obtain compared to water. Even if new supplies couldn’t be brought in, some grocery stores were opened by volunteers to clear out existing stock, and large supermarkets chartered ferries to bring in emergency supplies and continue operations.

Seeing the situation dragging on, many people began to leave the disaster area.

“By the morning of the 10th, cars carrying evacuees filled the major road, National Route 2, connecting Osaka and Kobe. Hotels in Osaka were already fully booked with these displaced people.”

 

Many people were growing increasingly frustrated with the response of the local governments and municipalities, but what stood out even more was the slow response from the national government. Although the earthquake struck at 5:46 a.m., it wasn’t until the afternoon that the government fully realized the severity of the situation. The first emergency press conference was finally held at 4:00 p.m.

The “Lessons of Hanshin-Awaji” Gained at the Cost of Tremendous Sacrifice

The delay in the government’s initial response, particularly the delayed dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces, was heavily criticized, and the approval ratings of Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama’s cabinet plummeted after the earthquake. The official disaster response order from the governor of Hyogo Prefecture was issued at 10 a.m., but the rescue operations by the Self-Defense Forces in Kobe didn’t begin until after 1 p.m. due to being caught in traffic near the scene.

The conditions in the evacuation centers during the Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake also became a major issue. Many people suffered from the stress of overcrowded shelters and fell ill due to poor sanitary conditions, including inadequate toilets. Many deaths occurred, leading to the term “disaster-related deaths” being coined. Around 900 people were believed to have died, but the exact number is thought to be higher due to the unclear definition of related deaths.

Volunteers played a crucial role in assisting the overwhelmed administrative response. Over 1.37 million people volunteered within the first year, distributing food, supplies, and providing hot meals. Later, volunteer groups were officially recognized as nonprofit organizations (NPOs), and 1995 became known as the “Year of Volunteering.”

The lessons left by the Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, gained at the cost of immense sacrifice, were many. These lessons are evident in the establishment of wide-area disaster rescue teams and Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMAT), which were vital during later disasters like the Great East Japan Earthquake. However, during the Noto Earthquake last year, there were criticisms about delayed initial responses, an inability to accurately assess the extent of the damage, and slow deployment of the Self-Defense Forces and emergency fire teams, leaving the on-the-ground needs unmet. There were also reports of insufficient volunteers after the governor urged them not to come.

When another major disaster strikes a large city, will we be able to apply the lessons of 30 years ago?