Experts in VIP Protection Sound Alarm Over Scene Examination of Former Prime Minister Abe and Prime Minister Kishida

On July 8, 2010, a tragic incident occurred in which former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was killed by a bullet. Whatever the outrage, murder is a crime and must not be tolerated. To prevent a recurrence, we asked Hidetomo Koyamauchi, 51, of the Association of International Bodyguards (AICPO), a professional bodyguard for dignitaries, to review the incident again on the occasion of the third anniversary of his death. In the first part of the article, “Clients range from foreign royalty to world-class athletes……An astute bodyguard reveals his “biggest enemy to date”” Mr. Koyamauchi, introduced in Part 2, is the deputy director of the International Association of Bodyguards, which protects Middle Eastern royalty, state guests, famous foreign artists, and athletes, and is also the representative of the association’s Japanese branch.

First, the Kintetsu Yamato Nishinokyo Station where former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe delivered a speech is crowded with pedestrian traffic, making it difficult to park campaign vehicles. Campaign speeches in busy areas often involve speaking from atop campaign vehicles to avoid approaching attackers on foot. Placing the campaign vehicle within the area could have protected Abe’s back, but on that day, the vehicle was unsuitable for speech from the top and could not be parked near the speaker due to lack of parking space.

The location is surrounded by guardrails on all sides, providing visibility to campaign supporters from all directions, facilitated by adjacent large commercial facilities and the presence of a station, making it easier for voters to gather. While this setup is ideal for appealing to law-abiding citizens, it requires security from all directions if there are malicious attackers. For attackers, it was the optimal location.

The Nara Prefectural Police hastily devised a security and protection plan the evening before Abe’s scheduled speech. Police and campaign staff visited the site to determine Abe’s positioning. Regarding the security arrangements at this location, Mr. Osanai was consulted.

Was there a problem with the security plan?

“The zebra zone surrounded by guardrails in front of Kintetsu Yamato Nishinokyo Station where this incident occurred was the worst place for an attack from any direction. At the core of any security plan, the very first consideration should be setting the boundary. Boundary here refers to deciding the extent of our security responsibility zone. For instance, when guarding a high-ranking bureaucrat in Kasumigaseki, it’s impossible to secure the entire area, so we define how far our security zone extends around the protected person. This is what we mean by setting the boundary.

And within that boundary, it’s crucial to establish a system that immediately notices suspicious individuals approaching. We also determine strategies for promptly dealing with suspicious or unauthorized persons entering that zone, especially at entry and exit points and along pathways where people move.

At entry points to this zone, we conduct access controls to regulate entry and ensure security control. In VIP protection duties, it’s vital to clearly define this security responsibility zone beforehand. This is what setting the boundary entails. Observing the movements of the police officers guarding Shinzo Abe, it seems they may have failed in both setting the boundary and access control. Perhaps they didn’t realistically anticipate the potential dangers that could occur at the scene.”

In the shooting incident involving former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, only one SP officer trained in VIP protection was present. Furthermore, due to the last-minute scheduling the previous evening, the hastily assembled Nara Prefectural Police security team lacked thorough education on VIP protection. According to a report compiled by the Metropolitan Police Department, the security detail in the zebra zone during the campaign consisted of only three officers from Nara Prefectural Police and one SP officer from the Metropolitan Police Department, totaling four personnel. The security personnel from Nara Prefecture were focused on the audience in front of them, while one officer watching the rear was distracted by bicycles and other matters, completely unaware of the approaching suspect.

So, how was the response after the incident occurred?

“Bodyguards perform an action called ‘Cover’ where they immediately intervene between the threat and the protected person when an attack occurs. Following this, they focus entirely on evacuating the protected person. While police officers direct their attention towards apprehending criminals during criminal activities, in close protection and VIP protection, the focus of bodyguards is on protecting and evacuating the protected person.

In the world of bodyguards, it’s said that there are only two actions to take in emergencies: ‘Cover & Evacuate’. ‘Cover’ involves intervening immediately to insert oneself between the threat and the protected person, preventing direct contact between danger and the protected person.

However, covering alone does not eliminate the threat, and there may be multiple threats or the possibility of further attacks, making it very dangerous to keep the protected person at the scene. Therefore, it’s crucial to evacuate them from the scene as quickly as possible. This is what ‘Evacuate’ entails. ‘Cover & Evacuate’ is the golden rule for bodyguards when emergencies occur.

Bodyguards are thoroughly trained to cover and evacuate immediately in emergencies, emphasizing the importance of preparing for evacuations like this. In the incident involving former Prime Minister Abe, his vehicle was stationed a bit away from the scene, and road closures were implemented quickly, preventing Abe’s vehicle from approaching the scene and causing delays in evacuation. This appears to be due to a lack of understanding of boundaries (the concept of where protection should extend) and a failure to plan for covering and evacuating in emergencies. The primary issue in this incident seems to be inadequate training and education for the security personnel responsible for close protection and VIP protection.”

Just nine months after former Prime Minister Abe was shot, on April 15, 2023, at a fishing port in Wakayama City, an incident occurred where explosives were thrown at Prime Minister Fumio Kishida during a campaign speech for a House of Representatives by-election. A police officer and a male member of the audience sustained minor injuries, but the Prime Minister was unharmed. Similar to the shooting incident involving former Prime Minister Abe, the perpetrator was apprehended on the spot and charged with attempted murder and violations of explosive substances regulations.

In the Kishida Prime Minister assassination attempt, the police had set up boundary lines such as cone bars between the audience and the protected person, Prime Minister Kishida. Additionally, they had parked emergency evacuation vehicles nearby and established restricted areas around these vehicles. Immediately after the incident occurred, police security personnel cleared the thrown explosive with their bags and feet, promptly evacuating the Prime Minister into an emergency evacuation vehicle.

Taking into account reflections from the shooting incident involving former Prime Minister Abe, it seems that the police also considered establishing a security zone and recognized the need for cover and evacuate measures.

How did Prime Minister Kishida’s administration handle this incident?

“For Mr. Kishida’s assault incident, there was considerable improvement compared to Mr. Abe’s time. They were able to quickly evacuate him into a car, and although I wondered about kicking explosives with their feet, the response was relatively swift. Perhaps during Mr. Abe’s time, they hadn’t actually anticipated being attacked, but that incident likely changed the police’s awareness, leading to a relatively quick response in Mr. Kishida’s case.”

Based on incidents where both the Prime Minister and former Prime Minister were attacked within a year, Mr. Osanai concluded as follows: 

“I don’t believe the police officers and SPs at the scene are at fault. They were likely doing their best with the tasks assigned to them. Certainly, during the attack on former Prime Minister Abe, the complete failure to execute the two basic emergency actions, ‘Cover & Evacuate,’ was a significant issue. However, skills such as crisis awareness, realistic threat assessment, and readiness in emergency response—both mentally and physically—are cultivated through education and training. Unless we fundamentally change this education and training, there is a possibility of similar incidents occurring again. It all depends on the education and training moving forward.”