Does the Takaichi Cabinet’s Approval Rating Prove a Shift to the Right? The Mystery Behind Its Resilient Casual Support

The Prime Minister’s true nature: “Right-wing authoritarianism”

The Sanae Takaichi administration marked its first anniversary in October. Just one month after the September Cabinet reshuffle, it was forced to dismiss its first cabinet minister, raising questions about the prime minister’s responsibility for the appointment. Nevertheless, its latest approval ratings remain in the 40–60% range.

Looking back over the past year, the Takaichi Cabinet has made measures to combat rising prices its top economic priority. Yet, with the yen continuing to weaken and commodity prices remaining stubbornly high, these measures have done little to ease the burden on household budgets. In foreign policy, too, there have been few notable achievements that have raised Japan’s profile on the international stage.

At the extraordinary Diet session held after the February general election, in which the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) secured a historic landslide victory, Prime Minister Takaichi pushed forcefully to pass several laws she had long championed and made a personal priority. These included the revised Imperial House Law, which would rule out the possibility of a female emperor despite broad public support for the idea; the National Intelligence Council Establishment Act, which reflects a state-first approach; and the Flag Desecration Penalty Act, which could lead to the forced promotion of patriotism. The list is dominated by policies with a strong right-wing orientation.

Japanese politics has increasingly been described as shifting to the right in recent years. If so, when did this trend begin?

Mitsuru Matsutani, a professor at Chukyo University and author of books including “Right-Wing Citizens and Japanese Politics: The Logic of Patriotism, Xenophobia, and Anti-Liberalism” (Asahi Shimbun Publications), explains:

“The period when Japan’s political shift to the right began to become particularly pronounced is generally considered to be around 2009, when the LDP lost power to the Democratic Party of Japan. Fearing that the LDP would continue to decline if things remained as they were, the party increasingly emphasized its right-wing identity to distinguish itself from the DPJ.

The LDP’s 2012 draft for constitutional revision, drawn up as the party sought to regain power, was symbolic of this trend. It explicitly reflected right-wing ideals and a particular vision of the state, including a provision for the establishment of a National Defense Force. Since then, it is fair to say that the LDP has consistently followed a right-leaning course.”

Takaichi’s policies and beliefs also strongly reflect right-wing values: her visits to Yasukuni Shrine, opposition to allowing married couples to retain separate surnames, and view of the imperial family that regards maintaining male-line succession as an absolute principle. Some have even described her as a right-wing populist.

“Populists are politicians like President Trump who harshly criticize privileged elites and pose as champions of ordinary people in order to win public support.

Takaichi’s words and actions do not show this kind of anti-elite rhetoric, so I wouldn’t call her a populist. In fact, I think Junichiro Koizumi was far more of a populist politician.”

Takaichi’s political approach—pressing ahead to realize her long-held beliefs and policies at all costs—is often discussed in terms of both conviction-driven leadership and an authoritarian style.

“Takaichi doesn’t seem to like behind-the-scenes dealmaking or internal party coordination. She strikes me as the type who makes every decision herself and pushes ahead with whatever course of action she believes in. Looking at her past initiatives and current statements, she is right-leaning and quite authoritarian. Her remarks about the Broadcasting Act when she was Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications are a typical example. She seems to favor imposing her will from above. You could call her a right-wing authoritarian.”

In 2016, while serving as Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications, Takaichi told the Diet that broadcasters violating political impartiality requirements could potentially face the suspension of their broadcasting licenses.

“The Flag Desecration Penalty Act is also a bill that epitomizes authoritarianism. There is no need to make it law, so I can think of no reason Takaichi has been so fixated on it other than to appeal to her core supporters, who want symbolic measures, and her own personal determination to see it through.”

A show of conviction that turns off the far right

In his book, “Right-Wing Citizens and Japanese Politics: The Logic of Patriotism, Xenophobia, and Anti-Liberalism,” published in February this year, Professor Matsutani defines right-wing citizens as follows:

People who strongly exhibit one or more of these four tendencies: patriotism, or love of Japan and its legacy from the Empire of Japan; traditionalism, or an emphasis on particular norms concerning family and sexuality; xenophobia, or hostility toward foreigners; and anti-leftism, or antagonism toward liberalism.

What proportion of the electorate do these right-wing citizens account for today?

“The proportion varies depending on the criteria, but I estimate that around 20% of all voters clearly express at least one of the four sets of values used to define right-wing citizens.

For example, some people may be xenophobic and strongly averse to China and South Korea, while accepting or simply not caring about allowing married couples to have separate surnames. In other words, although around 20% of voters may hold extreme views on particular issues, they are not necessarily extreme in all four areas. I hope people understand that distinction.”

Although the fervor is said to have subsided somewhat compared with its peak, enthusiastic expressions of support for Takaichi continue to flood the internet. Some users even direct vicious insults and defamatory attacks at those who criticize her, showing little tolerance for dissent. Do the people behind these extreme attempts to silence opposing views also belong to the category of right-wing citizens?

“I think people posting extreme comments come from various backgrounds, including so-called online right-wingers and people who manipulate public opinion as a business. However, if you look closely, it seems that the most extreme right-wing groups actually regard Takaichi’s stance as too soft.

On this year’s anniversary of the end of the war, Takaichi refrained from visiting Yasukuni Shrine in person, didn’t she? Before taking office, she had explicitly stated that she would continue visiting the shrine even after becoming prime minister. Yet she limited herself to paying her respects from the parking lot of the Nippon Budokan. I think she wanted to convey to her right-wing supporters that ‘I never break my promises,’ but hardline right-wingers likely saw it as yet another case of her ultimately giving in to foreign pressure and public opinion.

If she truly had conviction, she would have visited the shrine, fully prepared to face criticism. This is not limited to that incident. I get the impression that all of Takaichi’s actions are fundamentally motivated by a desire to be seen favorably by voters.”

Rather than having any deeply rooted convictions, she appears to be driven by an obsession with how she is perceived. This suggests a certain superficiality in her approach to politics.

Professor Matsutani also points out that Takaichi’s seemingly performative approach has drawn criticism from right-wing groups over her foreigner policies as well.

“More extreme groups criticize her for merely pretending to be tough and for taking a half-hearted approach. As a result, some people are drifting toward Sanseito and the Conservative Party of Japan, which advocate even more hardline positions.”

Does the rise in exclusionary rhetoric and hate speech directed at foreigners indicate that Japanese society is shifting to the right?

“Some researchers believe voters are moving to the right under the influence of right-wing political parties. I believe this tendency exists independently of what political parties advocate.

Japanese society has always had a considerable degree of wariness toward foreigners. Even without any major crimes committed by foreigners or a sudden influx of refugees, a single problem arising as the number of foreign residents increases can provoke an excessive reaction. This is probably because Japanese society is fundamentally not very good at accepting diversity. The closed nature of Japanese society has remained unchanged since the era of national isolation.”

The drifting voters behind Takaichi’s support

Ultimately, are Japanese voters shifting to the right or not?

“For example, we can see signs of a rightward shift in growing concern over issues involving foreign residents and greater acceptance of strengthening Japan’s defense capabilities in response to China’s expanding military power. However, just because voters are moving to the right on certain issues does not mean we can conclude that society as a whole has shifted to the right.

I would say the current state of Japanese society is that a gradual rightward shift is taking place on certain issues.”

If that is the case, why has the Takaichi administration, which is pushing ahead with strongly right-wing policies, managed to attract such high levels of support?

Professor Matsutani identifies three major factors behind this.

“First, for right-wing voters, the Takaichi administration is the kind of government they have wanted to see since the Shinzo Abe administration. Unlike the Kishida and Ishiba administrations that came in between, it is seen as a government that properly voices right-wing positions, earning strong trust among its core supporters.

Its most enthusiastic supporters began to grow in number around 2021, when Takaichi first ran for the LDP leadership. With overwhelming fervor, they shaped the atmosphere of online public opinion. Younger generations who do not watch television or read newspapers encounter a flood of online messages supporting Takaichi and opposing the left, and come to believe these views represent the consensus of society.

With this core support base dominating the internet, a psychological tendency to conform has spread among people who do not think deeply about politics: ‘Everyone else is supporting her, so I will too.’ I believe this is how her circle of support has expanded.”

The second factor is anxiety over national security in relation to neighboring countries and concern about the Japanese economy.

“Against the backdrop of rising international tensions, more people are worried about what would happen if China launched a military invasion.

There are also many young people who believe Japan should promote nuclear power because it can provide affordable, stable electricity, amid concerns over the country’s weakening economy.

When faced with immediate concerns and anxieties, voters may feel more reassured by the Takaichi administration, which promises to prepare for threats and move forward decisively, than by parties that focus on opposition and political ideals. That is probably how voters are judging the situation.”

The third factor is the weak presence of opposition parties that could serve as a counterweight, and the resulting spread of passive support.

It is undeniable that the Takaichi administration is being propped up not only by the active backing of its enthusiastic core supporters, but also by the vague support of unaffiliated voters who think there is no suitable alternative or that she is better than the other politicians.

“The opposition parties are unreliable and have such a weak presence that this has had a major impact. If an opposing force were to speak out forcefully and sharply point out the administration’s shortcomings, some people might begin to wonder whether they should really be supporting it so readily. But without a viable alternative, it is hardly surprising that people simply go along with the administration, thinking, ‘There is no one else to choose, so I suppose this one will do.’”

Professor Matsutani explains that the combination of these factors has produced the administration’s current high approval ratings.

“That said, I think Takaichi has succeeded in presenting herself as a symbol of the right. Right-wing voters are likely expecting her to deliver on issues such as constitutional revision, strengthening military capabilities, and fostering patriotism. They believe she is someone who will certainly tackle these issues.

But that does not mean her support base is unshakable. The Abe administration’s approval rating once plunged over the Moritomo and Kake scandals. There is no reason to believe the same could not happen to the Takaichi administration. If policy failures or scandals lead people to think, ‘Even I can’t defend this,’ her approval rating could fall just as sharply.”

It seems that, for half of the electorate, even this long-overdue cabinet dismissal was within the bounds of what they were willing to tolerate.

▼ Mitsuru Matsutani is a professor at Chukyo University’s School of Contemporary Sociology and a sociologist. He graduated from Nagoya University’s Faculty of Letters in 1998 and completed the required coursework for the doctoral program at Osaka University’s Graduate School of Human Sciences in 2004. His books include The Political Sociology of Populism: Voter Support and Voting Behavior (University of Tokyo Press), and he co-authored What Is the Online Right?(Seikyusha Library). His latest book is Right-Wing Citizens and Japanese Politics: The Logic of Patriotism, Xenophobia, and Anti-Liberalism (Asahi Shimbun Publications).

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