analyzed by a military journalist who claims, &#8220;Putin&#8217;s actions are difficult to predict, but his aims can be inferred from his words and actions.&#8221; &gt;
<figure id="attachment_233253" class="wp-caption aligncenter" style="width: 3077px;" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-233253"><a href="#" data-ident_hash="30fc3f06"><img src="https://res.cloudinary.com/fridaydigital/image/private/t_article_image/wpmedia/2022/03/aflo_182345978.jpg" alt=""></a><figcaption id="caption-attachment-233253" class="wp-caption-text">Two weeks into Putin&#8217;s war, with the world still fiercely protesting, there is still no &#8220;end in sight&#8221; (AFLO)</figcaption></figure>
<h2>We can guess what they are after.</h2>
Various speculations are reported daily, but whatever decision is made, it is President Putin who will make it. What is in his heart is not known to others. However, it is possible to guess the &#8220;scope of what he is aiming for&#8221; in the future from the words and actions of Mr. Putin himself or other key figures in his administration.
What Russia is doing now is an attempt to control other countries by threatening them with military force, something that could be condemned by the international community, but for which they are sure to justify themselves. They will always justify themselves against this, and they will publicly state that self-justification in advance and use it as a springboard for their actions.
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<h2>The rationale for starting a war is</h2>
For example, the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the subsequent pro-Russian uprising operations in the Donetsk and Lugansk provinces in eastern Ukraine used the rhetoric of &#8220;saving our Russian brethren. The theory was that Russian speakers, who live in large numbers in the area, were considered &#8220;compatriots&#8221; and that they were being oppressed and persecuted there, so they were to be helped. Although there is no evidence that Russian-speaking residents were systematically oppressed at the time, the Russians justified their military intervention on this basis.
In this light, what is being pushed to the fore this time is the demand for a guarantee of non-expansion of NATO. The responsibility lies with NATO, which expanded earlier and earlier, and by doing so Russia&#8217;s security was threatened. Russia is only making legitimate demands.
It is true that the number of countries participating in NATO has increased, and it is true that Russia&#8217;s security has been threatened, but each country has always had &#8220;its own decisions. Forcing another country&#8217;s policy by military force cannot be justified, but the Russian side is trying to justify it.
There is no way that NATO, the U.S., or Ukraine can accept such an unreasonable demand. In fact, the U.S. officially responded with a refusal on January 26, but what is noteworthy there are the words that President Putin had issued on December 21, 2021, as a milestone.
 If the West continues on its clearly hostile course, we will take appropriate military countermeasures and respond harshly to unfriendly actions.&#8221;
This is nothing more than a warning that if Russia&#8217;s demands are rejected, &#8220;the West may blame it for the invasion.
<h2>Russia&#8217;s &#8220;self-justification&#8221; is rock solid.</h2>
In fact, as of late January, the scale of the deployment of more than 100,000 field troops from all over Russia was at a level unparalleled since the end of the Cold War, and preparations for military operations were already underway. If President Putin had decided to invade, he would have been ready to do exactly what he said he would do, call it a &#8220;military countermeasure.
However, even if stopping NATO expansion is the stated political goal this time, that alone should not be considered the end of Russia&#8217;s intervention in Ukraine. The Putin regime has already laid the groundwork for self-justification of further actions.
<h2>Ukraine as a Satellite State</h2>
In July 2021, President Putin himself published a paper entitled &#8220;The Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians,&#8221; in which he argued that &#8220;they are the same people&#8221; and condemned Western intervention. This is tantamount to declaring that &#8220;Ukraine is Russia&#8217;s territory.
In other words, beyond simply protecting Russian speakers in Ukraine or preventing Ukraine from joining NATO, President Putin was laying the groundwork to justify turning Ukraine as a whole into a satellite state. It may be a step-by-step goal, not suddenly all at once, but if the entire Ukraine were to become a satellite state, it would be highly beneficial to Putin&#8217;s administration.
Russia could strengthen its own security by placing Belarus and Ukraine between it and the West, but that is not all. The major threat to Putin&#8217;s regime is the spread of human rights awareness and democracy from the West into Russia, which can also be blocked by placing these countries between Russia and the West. In addition, it would satisfy the nationalism of the Russian people and increase President Putin&#8217;s popularity.
Taking these factors into consideration, even if Ukraine were to yield to the Russian military and promise neutrality, Russia is very likely to establish a pro-Russian government and strengthen its rule through a variety of maneuvers.
<h2>The Surprising &#8220;Strength&#8221; of the Ukrainian Armed Forces</h2>
In any case, it is President Putin who will determine Russia&#8217;s future actions. Militarily, almost all options are being prepared. President Biden early on officially ruled out U.S. military intervention, so the Russians need only deal with the Ukrainian military; NATO deployment troops would be deployed to neighboring countries, but NATO would not move to fight the Ukrainian defense. In other words, the risk to Russia is not great.
However, the Ukrainian military also has a 200,000-strong force. A guerrilla war could result in heavy casualties for the Russian military, and if that happens, President Putin would be responsible. Economic losses would also be a negative factor, of course.
However, with such large demands, such self-justification, and such a large array of possible military operation options, there is no way that President Putin will &#8220;just bluff and do nothing. Looking at his past performance in Chechnya, Georgia, Crimea, Syria, and elsewhere, he has no hesitation in making choices that he deems &#8220;doable.&#8221;
The invasion had probably been in Putin&#8217;s mind for some time, but in making his decision, he must have been presented with a number of operational plans by military authorities who were not informed of the conclusion of the invasion. As for the specific invasion strategy, it is likely that Putin&#8217;s instructions from among them were carried out. 
<h2>All six possibilities were carried out.</h2>
The following is a list of options that were available to Putin before the war began.
 (1) Conclude the war with military pressure alone. (2) Conclude the war through military pressure alone. The Russian side&#8217;s minimum requirements would be full autonomy for the Donetsk and Lugansk People&#8217;s Republics and a guarantee of Ukraine&#8217;s neutrality. Alternatively, the Russians could use the military pressure as a backdrop to plan the establishment of a pro-Russian government through clandestine operations.
 (2) Military intervention in Donetsk and Lugansk to protect their compatriots. There is also a possibility of recognition of independence, which has been withheld until now. From there, a gradual invasion of the Ukrainian-controlled side of the two oblasts is also possible.
 (iii) Further invasion of areas with large numbers of Russian speakers. (4) Blockade of Odessa, invasion of the Azov Sea coast, and the breakthrough of the corridor between the Donetsk and Lugansk People&#8217;s Republics and Crimea, as well as the encirclement and control of the large city of Kharkov.
 (4) Bombing, siege, and invasion of the capital, Kiev
 (5) Widespread invasion east of the Dnepr River
 (6) Invasion of all of Ukraine at once, including from Crimea and Primorskiy Dniestr
以上、③以下は長期駐留と短期撤退があり得るが、⑤⑥はロシア軍の負担や犠牲も多くなるので、少なくとも長期駐留は難しいとみられていた。
Considering the political risk on the Russian side, the easier choice was (1) and (2), but even these were met with strong opposition from the Ukrainian side, and the fighting escalated.
I have pointed out that (iv) and (v) are extremely risky and the decision hurdle is high, but they are militarily feasible operations, and one should not be fooled into thinking that they will never happen. It was carried out, and a The situation will continue to change drastically. The developments are completely unreadable.
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One after another, things that the international community had thought were &#8220;unthinkable&#8221; have become reality. The future, in any case, all depends on Putin&#8217;s decision.
* This article is a reorganized version of &#8220;Countdown to War: Putin&#8217;s&#8217;Six Options&#8217; for Invading Ukraine,&#8221; a report by Fumitaro Kuroi, published on January 29, 2022.
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 Buntaro Kuroi

<Two weeks have passed since Russia's invasion of Ukraine. There is no "end in sight" to this war. This is because the established rules of international affairs do not apply. While many "experts" predicted that an invasion was "unlikely," Mr. Kuroi, Fumitaro, has been discussing the "realistic possibility" of an invasion and the "realistic possibility of an invasion.

Invasion of Ukraine, Putin’s Terrifying “Six Steps Game Plan”

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