Why Takaichi Chose a Snap Election—The Roles of Aso, Losing MPs, and Komeito

Aso sought an early dissolution and general election

At the very start of the new year, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi (64) appears poised to make a major decision.

Newspapers reported that during the ordinary Diet session to be convened on January 23, Prime Minister Takaichi is considering dissolving the House of Representatives.

“There was a very high possibility that a dissolution election would be held within the year. However, it was thought it would be after June, once the ordinary Diet session ended. A January dissolution would certainly be surprising,”

said political commentator Harumi Arima in an interview with this site.

If early, the election would be officially announced on January 27, with voting and counting on February 8.

What lay behind Prime Minister Takaichi’s move toward a New Year dissolution?

“One major factor is likely the intentions of Vice President Aso,”

revealed a political reporter from a national newspaper.

“From immediately after the administration was formed, Aso had been hoping for an early dissolution and general election, backed by the cabinet’s high approval ratings. Given that Aso was instrumental in establishing the Takaichi administration, his wishes carry great weight. Moreover, Prime Minister Takaichi met with lawmakers who lost their seats at the end of the year. At that time, those lawmakers, hoping to make a comeback in the next election, pressed her for an early dissolution and general election. Faced with strong requests from defeated lawmakers in addition to Aso’s intentions, Prime Minister Takaichi likely had no choice but to listen” (same national newspaper reporter).

It seems that behind Aso’s push for an early dissolution was not only the high cabinet approval ratings. One survey had reportedly become a hot topic in Nagatacho.

“Recently, opinion polls—not only among the Liberal Democratic Party but also among opposition parties—showed results indicating that the LDP could secure an outright majority on its own. This result sent shockwaves through each party. That’s because in elections held under the Takaichi administration, such as the Katsushika City Assembly election and the Mino mayoral election in Gifu Prefecture, Takaichi’s popularity did not translate into support for the LDP, and the party lost. However, analyzing opinion poll results and other data, LDP leaders likely concluded that they could win” (a source in Nagatacho).

The impact of a dissolution election on China policy

A factor believed to be driving the decision for an even earlier dissolution is the actions of the Komeito Party, which ended its coalition with the LDP when the Takaichi administration was formed. According to the aforementioned Arima:

“Komeito, which can swing around 20,000 votes in each electoral district, is the LDP’s biggest concern. For lawmakers on the borderline of winning or losing, the Komeito Party’s moves could mean mass defeats. However, moves toward electoral cooperation between the Constitutional Democratic Party and Komeito have barely progressed. If that’s the case, the idea of going to a general election before a cooperative framework is established is not an impossible strategy for the LDP,” he analyzes.

Considering all the circumstances, Prime Minister Takaichi likely saw this as the prime opportunity to achieve the long-desired outright majority for the LDP. A member of the Constitutional Democratic Party commented on this development:

“A while ago, a senior CDP official complained, ‘Noda (Representative Yoshihiko, 68) talks a big game, but it’s all just words,’ and that is precisely the case now. Even though they aim for a regime change, the party leader hasn’t even held talks with Komeito. They know that if CDP and Komeito cooperate, it could create a major wave, yet before the dissolution election, they’re just sitting idle,” the source said in exasperation.

Electoral cooperation aimed at forming a post-regime-change coalition would require significant effort, such as coordinating electoral districts and aligning policy pledges. Still, to compete with the highly popular Takaichi-led LDP, such preparation would be necessary.

“In Nagatacho, there is speculation that the LDP could gain as many as 50 seats. For Prime Minister Takaichi, beyond enabling stable parliamentary management, being recognized as the prime minister chosen by the people allows her to increase her diplomatic presence against China, which has been unsettled by her Taiwan remarks. You cannot underestimate a prime minister who wins a landslide victory in an election,” said the Nagatacho source.

Will the LDP achieve a landslide victory as Prime Minister Takaichi intends, or will it turn out to be nothing more than wishful thinking?