Rice Prices Keep Climbing for a Third Week—Was the Reiwa Rice Panic a Man-Made Crisis?

It is without a doubt a man-made disaster

How long will the “Reiwa Rice Panic” continue? More than a year has passed since rice disappeared from supermarket shelves and prices began to soar, yet the cost of rice remains stubbornly high.

According to the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) on the 19th, the nationwide average price of rice sold at supermarkets between October 8 and 14 was 4,275 yen per 5 kilograms. Thanks to the release of stockpiled rice sold at around 2,000 yen per 5 kilograms through negotiated contracts, the average price had once dropped to the 3,500-yen range in July. However, as newly harvested rice began entering the market at high prices, the average once again exceeded 4,000 yen this month — marking the third consecutive week of price increases.

NHK’s historical drama Berabō recently depicted the “Tenmei Riots,” an uprising of commoners unable to endure skyrocketing rice prices. Indeed, Japan has faced many rice-related crises throughout history.

More recently, the “Heisei Rice Panic” occurred in 1993. That year’s record-breaking cold summer caused a catastrophic crop failure, leaving the country more than 2 million tons short of rice. With no rice stockpiling system in place at the time and only 230,000 tons of government reserves available, Japan urgently imported over 2 million tons of foreign rice, mainly from Thailand.

While the “Heisei Rice Panic” was caused by natural disaster, the “Reiwa Rice Panic” is different.

Professor Emeritus Kazumitsu Oizumi of Miyagi University, an expert in agricultural management, stated firmly:

“The Reiwa Rice Panic is without a doubt a man-made disaster.”

According to Oizumi, the MAFF deliberately reduced rice production by 500,000 tons over two years (2021–2022) through production adjustment policies. As a result, the 2022 harvest fell short by 210,000 tons, and the 2023 harvest by 440,000 tons. By the end of June 2024, private sector rice stockpiles were 400,000 tons less than the previous year.

Yet, MAFF attributed last summer’s rice shortage to panic buying triggered by the Nankai Trough Earthquake emergency information, claiming that shortages would mostly resolve once new rice came to market in September.

Oizumi counters:

“When there’s a poor harvest, you can stabilize supply by maintaining the same volume of rice distribution. During the 1993 Heisei panic, Japan imported 2.6 million tons of foreign rice, and prices quickly stabilized the following year.

In 2003, another cool summer caused a 1.1-million-ton shortfall. But thanks to the rice stockpiling system introduced in 1995 as a lesson from 1993, the government released reserve rice and prevented a crisis.

Last summer, MAFF should have done the same. However, when Osaka Governor Hirofumi Yoshimurarequested the release of reserve rice, the ministry refused — likely because they didn’t recognize the severity of the shortage.”

Ther was another reason for withholding the reserves:

“Releasing stockpiled rice could lower market prices. In short, MAFF wanted to avoid any action that might depress rice prices.”

Even as prices continued to climb, the ministry stayed silent throughout 2024. It wasn’t until February of this year that MAFF finally announced it would release 210,000 tons of reserve rice.

“At the time, MAFF claimed that while production had increased by 180,000 tons from the previous year, 210,000 tons had somehow disappeared. They blamed distribution bottlenecks and released the same amount from reserves.

But by late July, they admitted a shortfall of 320,000 tons, finally acknowledging that the rice shortage was the real cause of the price surge.

Had they released the reserves immediately after supermarket shelves were emptied following the earthquake warning, rice prices would never have risen this high. This was entirely MAFF’s mistake — the Reiwa Rice Panic can rightly be called an ‘officially induced rice crisis.’”

There’s a bubble happening

Professor Emeritus Kazunobu Oizumi, in his 2014 book Kibō no Nihon Nōgyōron (NHK Books), wrote that Japan’s agricultural policy has subordinated all issues to rice price stabilization, arguing that the outlook for agriculture depends on maintaining rice prices. He noted that rice prices have been supported by the politics-bureaucracy-agriculture triangle.

This triangle refers to the collaboration of politicians (LDP lawmakers from agricultural constituencies), bureaucrats (Ministry of Agriculture officials), and agricultural organizations (JA cooperatives). Professor Oizumi says this power structure in rice policy hasn’t changed.

“The cooperatives believe that keeping rice prices high enriches Japanese agriculture. The Ministry of Agriculture mistakenly thinks price stabilization is the essence of policy. Politicians believe that promising high rice prices will win votes. The three are tightly linked through rice price policies.

During elections, cooperatives deliver farmers’ votes to LDP candidates, who in return pressure the Ministry to protect farmers. Bureaucrats receive positions from politicians and allocate budgets to cooperatives.”

Although the Reiwa rice crisis is considered a man-made disaster, is it possible it was intentional? After all, rice prices have risen exactly as the politics-bureaucracy-agriculture triangle would want.

“It’s unclear whether bureaucrats intended this; they may have simply been incompetent. However, JA Zenchu Chairman Toru Yamano said that a rice price of around 4,200 yen per 5 kg is not considered high, so there are certainly people welcoming the price surge.

For example, at around 3,500 yen, farmers profit but wholesalers and retailers gain little. At over 4,000 yen, cooperatives earn more through transaction fees, and wholesalers and retailers also increase their margins. Everyone involved in rice is profiting. A bubble has occurred.”

While rice farmers and cooperatives benefit, prices above 4,000 yen per 5 kg hurt consumers. The new rice hitting supermarket shelves this year is even more expensive than the 2024 crop, increasing household burdens.

“Advance payments (gaisan-kin) from JAs to farmers have risen about 1.7 times from last year. For brand-name rice, the advance payment is around 30,000 yen per 60 kg (≈2,500 yen per 5 kg). This pushes retail prices to around 4,500–5,000 yen per 5 kg.

By late October to November, when the harvest is finalized, a significant increase may lower prices slightly. Still, it’s unlikely they will drop below 4,000 yen.”

If rice prices remain high, consumer abandonment of rice may accelerate.

“Rice consumption will polarize. Brand-conscious consumers will buy new rice even at high prices. Meanwhile, about 150,000 tons of reserved rice remain. With 30,000–40,000 tons released per month, low-cost options around 2,000 yen per 5 kg will be available until year-end.However, the most demanded price range is the 3,000-yen level. Currently, blended rice using reserved stocks is selling around 3,000 yen. The 2024 brand rice will soon become old stock and drop to this range, but only by October.”

After the 3,000-yen range disappears:

“From around October, large amounts of imported rice will likely cover the 3,000-yen segment. The foodservice industry, which needs 3,000-yen rice, may rely on imported rice. Unless the government decides to increase domestic production next year and signal price reductions, the share of domestic rice could decline.”

If certain policies are stopped, “We could increase production by about 5 million tons.”

Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba announced on August 5 that his administration would shift its policy toward increasing rice production. The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) included a budget item for achieving production increases in line with rice demand in its preliminary budget request for FY2026, released on August 29. During the budget compilation process, some LDP lawmakers from agricultural constituencies expressed caution over using the word increase, which is why the phrasing was softened to production increase according to demand.

Will rice production actually increase? Will the government end production controls?

“Increasing production basically means ending production controls. That’s how I interpret it. But because the budget item is phrased as increase according to demand, I think this will be an increase while still keeping some brakes on production control.”

Looking at the FY2026 preliminary budget, the “Direct Payment Subsidy for Rice Field Utilization” remains in place, supporting programs that encourage switching rice fields to other crops.

“The government has spent 350 billion yen annually to encourage farmers to switch from rice to soybeans or wheat, as part of production control. I think using subsidies instead for improving rice cultivation infrastructure or consolidating rice fields would be far more productive.”

Professor Kazunuki Oizumi, author of Hopeful Japanese Agriculture, also notes that farmers switching from staple rice to non-staple rice (like feed rice or processed rice) still receive subsidies.

“Smaller farms often cannot grow other crops, so they continue cultivating rice that counts as conversion crops for feed or processing. Since these types of rice fetch low market prices, subsidies are given. If production control were eliminated, large-scale farms alone could increase production by about 5 million tons. The question is whether production controls will actually be abolished.”

With Prime Minister Ishiba stepping down and Taku Eto, the former Agriculture Minister criticized for saying he had never bought rice, appointed chairman of the LDP’s newly established Agricultural Structural Reform Promotion Committee, the direction of rice policy remains uncertain.

“Concrete discussions are needed to ensure rice production actually increases. Rice is the staple food of Japan. I want Japan to be 100% self-sufficient in rice and fully utilize its rice paddies, a national resource. Without a shift in agricultural policy now, Japanese rice farming could face extinction.”

Kazunuki Oizumi – Agricultural economist, Professor Emeritus at Miyagi University. Born 1949, Miyagi Prefecture. Completed master’s at the Graduate School of Agriculture, University of Tokyo. Former professor and vice president at Miyagi University. Author of The Strength of Japanese Agriculture, Hopeful Japanese Agriculture, and Food Value Chains Transforming Japanese Agriculture.