LDP’s Phantom Members Boost Party Fees, Enable Corporate Bribery

The party membership system is a mechanism for citizens to participate in politics and have their voices reflected. In the first part, we investigated how this system within the LDP has become a tool to buy official endorsements with money. However, it has also emerged that the phantom members used in this process function not only as tools to obtain endorsements but also as a money laundering machine that cleverly conceals corporate donations and circulates opaque funds. What mysteries lie within the LDP’s party membership list, which hides roughly 4 billion yen in party fees?

[Part 1] “Pay money, get official endorsement” — 50 names listed at one apartment. The phantom member list fueling the LDP’s huge party fees is here.

The Ultimate Black Box Called Party Fees

In the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), members of the National Diet are required to recruit 1,000 party members as a quota. For prefectural assembly members, the quota is 200, and for city council members, 50. If these quotas are not met, they basically cannot receive official party endorsement. Some lawmakers struggle to meet these quotas, but even if they create ghost party members, where does the money for those membership fees come from? Basically,

“The lawmaker either pays out of their own pocket or gets support from companies or organizations, and that money is used for the membership fees,” (an LDP insider) says.

In other words, support from companies and organizations is funneled into party fees. According to an LDP insider, here is how the scheme works:

“For example, suppose a lawmaker’s office asks Company A to cover membership fees for 25 people, amounting to 100,000 yen. The office says, ‘We’ll give you a copy of the membership application later,’ then issues a receipt for 100,000 yen under the name of the election branch to Company A. Company A records these 100,000 yen as an expense under the name of membership fees or similar. The lawmaker’s office fills the membership application with fictitious names but sometimes also receives employee lists from companies.”

In this way, corporate donations are disguised as party fees alongside the ghost party members. As mentioned in the previous part, when questioned about the ghost party member issue involving Representative Hiroaki Tabata (52), whose case came to light during last October’s House of Representatives election, a staff member for Tabata said:

“When reporters asked if there were bankbooks or proof showing party fee transactions, the answer was no. There are no bank transfers or account debits; all collection is done in cash.”

This statement reveals the shadowy nature of the party fees. Since collections are done in cash, there is no objective evidence of the total amount or source of the fees.

“Around summer, membership cards arrive at the office and serve as receipts. The secretary hands out membership cards in exchange for cash. Even companies that paid for ghost members get membership cards in bulk but often say, ‘We don’t need those,’” said the aforementioned LDP insider.

Because funds from companies and organizations get mixed in like this, it becomes impossible to trace the money. Even if Tabata’s explanation is unconvincing, tracking the source of ghost party members’ fees is extremely difficult.

So, what happens to these opaque party fees once collected? Here lies another core of the problem.

Party fees gathered by city councilors, prefectural assembly members, and national Diet members are first consolidated at the prefectural federation. One-quarter of these funds is allocated to the LDP headquarters, one-quarter remains with the prefectural federation, and the remaining half is returned to the party branches or lawmakers who recruited the members. In other words, half of the party fees collected by lawmakers return to the lawmakers or their affiliated branches.

This reflow is the final stage that turns the party fees into a money laundering machine, according to the aforementioned LDP insider.

“Included in the reflowed party fees is the portion paid by companies on behalf of ghost party members. For example, if a company pays 1 million yen in party fees, up to half of that—500,000 yen—can return as cash to the branch headed by the lawmaker. This is effectively a kickback. Companies can make donations without it being publicly known, and lawmakers receive cash. The party fee system enables this distorted win-win relationship.”

The same response as “I’ll confirm just to be sure.”

As reported in detail in the first part, FRIDAY Digital obtained a copy of the party membership list compiled in 2018 by Tomohiro Yamamoto, former Deputy Minister of Defense (Kanagawa 4th District, lost in the 2024 general election). The list contained implausible information, stating that up to 50 party members were residing at the home addresses of his secretaries and multiple supporters. FRIDAY Digital sent the problematic list to both Yamamoto’s office and the LDP headquarters to request verification.

To Yamamoto’s office, the following questions were submitted: ① the authenticity of the party members ② the reason for fictitious registrations ③ How the party membership fees were funded

In response, Yamamoto’s office submitted the following written statement:

“We conduct our political activities properly in accordance with the law. The materials you provided relate to events from nearly 10 years ago, so we will check, just in case, whether any records still exist.”

Meanwhile, a letter of inquiry was sent to the LDP headquarters asking: ① Whether the party was aware of the fictitious registrations ② the source of the party fees ③ the lack of transparency in the financial reports ④ the membership quotas ⑤ How the party intends to address the issue

The response from the LDP’s Organization Movement Headquarters was nearly identical to that of Yamamoto’s office:

“We conduct our political activities properly in accordance with the law. The materials you provided relate to events from nearly 10 years ago, so we will check, just in case, whether any records still exist.”

In response to specific allegations, both parties essentially gave zero answers and avoided addressing the core of the issue.

As of 2024, the LDP publicly reported having 1.03 million party members. Based on this figure, the total annual party membership fees collected nationwide are estimated to be around 4 billion yen. A considerable portion of this massive amount is believed to be under-the-table donations disguised as party fees paid on behalf of phantom members by corporations and other entities.

Of the collected fees, about 1 billion yen goes to LDP headquarters, another 1 billion yen to the prefectural federations, and the remaining 2 billion yen is funneled back to lawmakers across the country. In other words, this structure supports not only kickbacks to individual lawmakers but also the operational funds of the party’s central headquarters and regional branches—through these opaque funds.

It is nearly impossible to determine how much under-the-table money is hidden inside this 4-billion-yen black box. As has been stated repeatedly, the party membership system is supposed to be a mechanism that allows citizens to participate in politics and reflect their voices in party decision-making. However, in reality, it has become a tool for number padding to secure party endorsements and is being exploited as a money laundering machine to funnel opaque corporate donations back to lawmakers.

The phantom member issue is not simply a matter of individual lawmakers’ ethics. Harsh membership quotas that corner lawmakers, opaque fundraising systems, and the fund-recycling mechanism that generates money.

All of these point to a structural issue deeply embedded in the LDP that has been left unaddressed for years. This phantom member problem, which fundamentally betrays voter trust and guts the intent of the Political Funds Control Act, must be subjected to thorough reform.