Playback ’05] “Nippon Broadcasting System, Inc. stock purchase scandal” – Fuji Television is in a difficult position because of Hollimon’s ministry.

What did “FRIDAY” report 10, 20, and 30 years ago? In “Playback Friday,” we take a look back at the topics that were hot at the time. This time, we will look back at the article “Holliemon raises another 50 billion yen in funding! Horie raises another 50 billion yen!” This time, we will introduce ” Horie vs.

Fuji Television Network has been rocked by compliance issues stemming from Masahiro Nakai’s “90 million yen settlement” scandal. Coincidentally, there was a similar scandal that threatened the very existence of Fuji Television 20 years ago. This was the acquisition of Nippon Broadcasting System, Inc. by Livedoor, which was led at the time by Takafumi Horie, then 32, a.k.a. Holliemon.

On February 8, 2005, Horie announced that Livedoor had acquired 35% of Nippon Broadcasting System’s outstanding shares. Over the next two months, the “takeover war” that had captured the attention of all of Japan was set in motion. (Descriptions in parentheses are quotations from previous articles. All ages are current at the time).

We don’t want Livedoor to interfere at all.

Due to the historical background of its establishment, Fuji Television had an awkward capital structure, with Nippon Broadcasting System, which has by far the smallest presence and the largest assets, as the largest shareholder. Controlling Nippon Broadcasting System would allow him to take control of Fuji Television’s management at the same time. With this in mind, Mr. Horie took advantage of after-hours trading to acquire Nippon Broadcasting’s shares in one fell swoop. He became the largest shareholder with a 35% stake.

He said, “I really don’t want Livedoor to interfere in any way with the management of Fuji Television. In the worst case scenario, we could sell the Nippon Broadcasting System shares and cut it off from the group.

A Fuji Sankei Group executive told this magazine, “I don’t want to get involved in the management of the company.

Horie was not silent in his response to the Fuji Sankei Group management’s refusal to be involved in the management of the company, either.

As a major shareholder who bought 35% of Nippon Broadcasting System, I would like to ask them for a business tie-up with us, but they are not listening to us at all. If they don’t want us to buy 35% of their shares, they shouldn’t have gone public in the first place.

Horie remained bullish, but there were reports that the reason for his bullish stance was because he had succeeded in raising 50 billion yen in financing from the company backing the acquisition. He was so confident that some people in the know said, “He already thinks he is the president of the company.

Chairman Hieda expresses his displeasure

At the time, Softbank, with its Yahoo Japan subsidiary, and Rakuten, which was in hot pursuit with its Rakuten Ichiba (Rakuten Market), were the “top two” when it came to the Internet business. For Livedoor’s Horie, who was following in their footsteps, “taking over” Fuji Television was probably a major reversal of fortune.

“This case originated from Livedoor’s failed attempt to acquire a baseball team. Livedoor failed to acquire a baseball team, but Softbank and Rakuten succeeded in owning a team. If they bought Nippon Broadcasting System, they could be involved in the management of BayStars and other teams, and Mr. Horie wanted to catch up with them at any cost,” said an investment consultant.

Meanwhile, then Fuji Television Chairman Hisashi Hieda expressed his displeasure with Livedoor’s acquisition of Nippon Broadcasting System, commenting as follows.

Journalism is not an easy business. We have a social responsibility. All we can do is ask our shareholders to make the TOB a success. If Livedoor tries to prevent us from doing so, we must respond.

In response to Fuji’s attempts to somehow prevent Livedoor from making a TOB, Livedoor had indicated its intention to buy up to over 50% of the company, obtain the right to appoint directors, implement a capital increase, and reduce Fuji’s ownership ratio as much as possible. The first round was a mutual decision, but what would happen in the second round?　One investment-related person suggested the following.

Livedoor continued to buy more shares after February 8, bringing its ownership ratio to 37.67% (as of February 15, 2005). Assuming that Livedoor still has 50 billion yen to spare in funds, it is only 4.92 million shares or 30 billion yen away from the 50% mark, which would easily clear the majority.

The whole of Japan was watching this takeover battle with bated breath.

A “theatrical M&A” that caught the attention of all of Japan.

As you know, the end result was that Fuji TV defended itself and Mr. Horie’s ambition was ended.

During the two-month battle, Nippon Broadcasting System tried to issue new share subscription rights to Fuji Television, which Livedoor blocked with a provisional injunction. During this period, Mr. Horie’s daily comments to the media, such as “It’s already dead in the water” and “within our expectations,” became a bit of a buzzword and were dubbed “theatrical M&A.”

The decisive moment came on March 24, when it was announced that Nippon Broadcasting System, Inc. would lease its stake in Fuji Television Network to SBI (Softbank Investment). Livedoor, which had eventually purchased up to a majority of Nippon Broadcasting’s shares, was unable to fulfill its original plan even after acquiring Nippon Broadcasting in the end. In the end, the two parties “parted ways,” with Livedoor transferring its Nippon Broadcasting shares to Fuji Television and Fuji Television taking an equity stake in Livedoor.

Horie, who had also made a name for himself the previous year with his purchase of a professional baseball team, gained a great deal of publicity from this fiasco. At the same time, however, he was also subjected to a definite sense of distrust and dislike from those involved in the business world. This may have led to the “Livedoor Incident” in January 2006.